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major problems. In a few instances however the author does not make clear what is
intended by his references. In a note to James v. UnionNationalBank3 (on page 469),
for instance, which allows the payee of an unaccepted check to recover in conversion
from the drawee-bank which had paid on an unauthorized indorsement, Professor
Aigler raises the question among others whether the payee or drawer of a check has
to bear the risk of the drawee-bank's becoming insolvent before the check has been
presented. The authorities which he cites in this connection do not throw any light
on the subject for in none of them was the drawee-bank insolvent; on the contrary
in all these cases a forged check has been paid either to the forger or to a holder subsequent to the forger. Most of the cases discuss the problem whether the payee of
a check may recover from the drawer either on the instrument or on the underlying
indebtedness where the forger was an agent of the payee who had received the check
within the scope of his authority but had no authority to cash checks. Professor
Aigler's question is answered by section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law as
he himself indicates. The creditor who receives the check in payment has to present
it to the drawee-bank within a reasonable time. If he fails to do so and the draweebank becomes insolvent in the meantime, the drawer-bank is discharged on the instrument as well as on the underlying claim up to the amount of the loss which has
4
been caused by the creditor's laches. In a footnote to the famous Canal Bank case
(on page 550), Professor Aigler discusses some of the problems presented by a guarantee of the genuineness of prior indorsements and- in this connection he raises the
question as to the consideration supporting such guarantee. There seems, however,
to be ample consideration for the recipient's guarantee which may either be regarded
as a unilateral promise supported by the drawee-bank's payments or the binding effect
of which may be explained by the theory that the drawee-bank when paying a forged
check does more than is called for in its contract with the drawer, or, when paying,
is acting in reliance on such promise. 6
IEDERICH KESSLER*

How To Deal with Organized Labor. By Alexander Feller and Jacob E. Hurwitz.
New York: Alexander Publishing Co., 1937. Pp. 678. $6.50.
The authors of this book have set out frankly to write a manual of labor relations
for employers and their counsel. It is their claim that they have "carefully examined
the creation, structure and operation of the labor Unions, diligently studied the powers
of the labor Board under the law, impartially observed a large number of its decisions
and respectfully listened to the pronouncements of the courts."' That would be a
large order for anyone, and Messrs. Feller and Hurwitz have not filled it. Rather, they
have hastily, and with the unmistakable air of the amateur, looked at a few union
organizations; superficially rehearsed the provisions of the National Labor Relations
3 238 Ill. App. &59 (1925). The court said by way of dictum that the bank's payment
"destroyed all right of action the plaintiff might have had against the maker in case of nonpayment."
4 Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, i Hill (N.Y.) 28 (1841).
6Id. at § go.
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Act; gingerly questioned some of the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board;
and listened raptly to the dissents of Mr. justice McReynolds. These may be the constituents of a first-rate handbook of labor relations for the use of management. They
do not yield a reliable or a lawyerlike study of the problems and the law in this field.
The National Labor Relations Act has been called everything from the Magna
Carta of American workers to the knell of private property in this country. It is
neither of these. (Those who do not read this book will miss a passage in which the
writers soberly marshall evidence to sustain the conclusion that "the policy as expressed in the Act does affirm the underlying basis of the capitalistic system.")2 The
Act guarantees the rights to self-organization and the free choice of representatives
for collective bargaining. In word, if not in deed, these elemental rights have for a
long time been acknowledged everywhere-even in New Jersey. This statute breaks
new ground by attacking the entrenched resistance to those rights at its heart-the
influence, beneficent or malevolent, of employers upon employees exercising, or wishing to exercise, them. Paternalism, in an area carefully prescribed and commonly
understood, has been outlawed.
As long ago as 1915 the need for this approach to the perennial problems of labor
relations was wisely summarized by Mr. Justice Brandeis. Testifying before the Commission on Industrial Relations then investigating contemporary industrial strife,
he said: "My observation leads me to believe that while there are many single things
-single causes-contributing causes to industrial unrest, that there is one cause which
is fundamental, and it is the necessary conflict between-the contrast between-our
political liberty and the industrial absolutism .... unrest, in my mind, never can
be removed, and fortunately never can be removed, by mere improvement of the
physical and material condition of the workingman .... we must have, above all
things, men; and it is the development of manhood to which an industrial and social
system must be directed .... the end to which we must move is a recognition of
industrial democracy."3 That is precisely the end sought by the National Labor
Relations Act, but the present authors have not yet made the discovery. From their
lack of perception flow repeated failures to grasp the rationale both of the decisions
and of the administrative policies of the N.L.R.B.
Thus Messrs. Feller and Hurwitz obviously, though not expressly, disapprove the
Board's refusal to entertain, in actions under section 8, defenses founded upon the
character of labor organizations, the conduct of union affairs or the deportment of
workers. They cannot understand why a kindly and conscientious employer should
not advise his employees even when they request it, when and how and why to join
or not to join a union. They deplore the Board's apparent disregard of "labor racketeering." To them management is ever the father; when its guardianship is dissolved they demand intervention by the Board. The National Labor Relations Act
was a belated acknowledgment of the coming of age of American workers. It freed
them by restraining their masters. It made real for them words which hitherto had
been but oratorical symbols. It did, and said, nothing else. Union management is the
affair of unions. Unless and until a law is violated it is their affair alone. Labor unions
and members of unions, and sympathizers with unions, are subject to criminal and
2 P. 202.
3 Quoted in Senate Report No. 46, Part 3, 75 th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6: Report of the Committee on Education and Labor Pursuant to S. Res. 266 (La Follette Committee).
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civil penalties for misconduct. The burden of the Act is to protect the independence
of employees from interference by employers. Congress has left no room for doubt
that it is not for the Board to substitute a new paternalism.
The errors of fact and of law in this book, the innuendos with a blurred ring, are
beyond number. Even the citation of the N.L.R.A. is inaccurate.4 It is impossible
here even to catalogue, much less to correct them. A few, reiterated and embroidered,
must be mentioned. In numerous chapters there occur frequent forebodings as to
the limitless scope of the Act, predictions of its probable extension over all business
which is at any time contiguous to interstate commerce. Yet the majority opinion in
the Jones and Laugldin case, in language quoted by the authors themselves, explicitly
rules out any such possibility. It denies that the preamble (sec. i), upon which the
writers rely, gives any authority for this view. Said the Chief Justice: "But we are
not at liberty to deny effect to specific provisions which Congress has constitutional
power to enact, by superimposing upon them inferences from general legislative declarations of an ambiguous character, even if found in the same statute ..... We think
it dear that the National Labor Relations Act may be construed so as to operate
within the sphere of constitutional authority ..... "5 It is by such a construction that
the Board is bound and must be limited. It is under this very interpretation that the
judgment of the Board has been upheld in each of the 162 cases decided by it which
has reached the Circuit Courts of Appeals.6 Messrs. Feller and Hurwitz should know
this.
Subsection 5 of section 8, which prohibits employers from refusing to bargain
collectively with the representatives freely chosen by a majority of the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit, is another bugbear to these authors. They find no
affirmative guides to proper employer conduct in the decisions of the Board under
this section; the cases, inevitably, debate only what constitutes a failure to bargain
in good faith. Consequently Feller and Hurwitz would like us to think that employers
are at the mercy of unions in this respect, that they must in some degree yield to whatever requests are made of them. The writers are shocked to find the Board of the mind
that the duty to bargain continues during, or if it has previously ceased, may be
revived by a strike. Their view bespeaks incomprehension of the place, in legislation
designed to "diminish the causes of labor disputes" and to "mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred," of the collective bargaining device.
As the Board put it in the Consumers' Research case, "To interpret the Act to mean
that upon appearance of industrial strife in a particular case the duty to bargain
collectively is extinguished would be to nullify the dear intent of Congress and to
disregard the very purpose of the law; to say that in the event of violence the duty
to bargain is extinguished, is to interpret the Act to mean that, as and when industrial
warfare appears it shall be permitted to run its course, burdening or threatening to
burden commerce, with no obligation whatever imposed by the Act to attempt to
remove the burden, or threatened burden, by collective negotiations. The Act will
not bear such an interpretation."7 It is not, of course, the employer's duty to grant
4 Appendix,
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6Statement of J. Warren Madden, Chairman, N.L.R.B., to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, on S. Res. 207, February 3, 1938; NLRB Release No. R-571, p. 4.
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any particular demands of his employees. He is no more at their mercy than is any
offeree at the hands of one who makes a proposal. His obligation is simply to receive
the representatives of the majority, to discuss with them the matters to which they
invite his attention and to negotiate with them in good faith in a genuine effort to
achieve mutual understanding and satisfaction. No business man in his daily dealings
would expect less.
Throughout the book there are analyses, conclusions and prognostications to which
one must take exception were space available. At the same time the most controversial
and important problems which the Board is now facing are ignored. There is no
reference to the difficult question under section 9(a) of small but strong craft unions
in the midst of large bodies of production workers organized on an industrial basis. 8
No mention is made of the matter of according to voters opportunity to express
through the ballot indifference to all the bargaining agencies competing in an election.9
None of the recent decisions of the Board is included. The harassing issues growing
out of the schism in labor are thus but lightly touched.
In those parts of the book which pose generally the strategy to be adopted by employers who may be subject to the Act there is some plain speaking. Management
would do well to listen to the sound advice of these authors relating to bullish strike
tactics and the necessity for objective standards of hire and discharge. The primitive
state of mind which has produced the kind of opposition encountered by the N.L.R.B.
and the La Follette Committee is evidenced equally by the chaotic practices prevailing in personnel administration. These healthy reminders, however, suffer like
the rest of the book from the incompetence of the writing. Grammatical and typographical carelessness infects the entire volume. This reviewer does not recall an
inferior performance in book production. Employers who are seeking a trustworthy
guide in their labor relations will save themselves the price of this work by referring
their attorneys to the published decisions and the annual reports of the National
Labor Relations Board.
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